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Abstract—The proliferation of information disseminated by
public/social media has made decision-making highly challenging
due to the wide availability of noisy, uncertain, or unverified
information. Although the issue of uncertainty in information has
been studied for several decades, little work has investigated how
noisy (or uncertain) or valuable (or credible) information can be
formulated into people’s opinions, modeling uncertainty both in
the quantity and quality of evidence leading to a specific opinion.
In this work, we model and analyze an opinion and information
model by using Subjective Logic where the initial set of evidence
is mixed with different types of evidence (i.e., pro vs. con or noisy
vs. valuable) which is incorporated into the opinions of original
propagators, who propagate information over a network. With
the help of an extensive simulation study, we examine how the
different ratios of information types or agents’ prior belief or
topic competence affect the overall information diffusion. Based
on our findings, agents’ high uncertainty is not necessarily always
bad in making a right decision as long as they are competent
enough not to be at least biased towards false information (e.g.,
neutral between two extremes).
Index Terms—Subjective logic, uncertain opinion, information
credibility, prior belief, and topic competence.
I. INTRODUCTION
Decision making under uncertainty becomes more challeng-
ing as we are living with flooding amounts of unverified infor-
mation provided by public/social media, and/or interpersonal
interactions in an individual’s online/offline social network.
Many existing studies have examined the key factors that
impact the dynamics of opinions in different domains. In the
mass communication, perceptions of news credibility from
public media (e.g., newspapers, online news, television, radio)
have been studied to investigate if there exists any link between
the change of public opinion and the perception of public
media news [9]. In the network science, a rich amount of
literature investigated how the choice of seeding nodes propa-
gating initial information affects information diffusion [5, 12].
However, little work has studied how individuals process
uncertain, noisy information, how their topic competence (e.g.,
expertise or knowledge on a given topic) affects processing of
noisy (or uncertain) or valuable (or credible) information, and
the subsequent results of these factors on the opinions and
beliefs of individuals.
In this work, we develop an agent-based opinion and
information model by considering agents processing infor-
mation differing in its bias (e.g. supporting a pro or con
point of view) and in its value (e.g. noisy vs. valuable)
and forming opinions with a degree of uncertainty. In this
work, we define the concepts of ‘noisy’ and ‘valuable’ in
terms of uncertainty and credibility, respectively. In particular,
the concept of uncertainty indicates vagueness (i.e., unclear
without reasonable, analytical reasoning or clear facts) and/or
ambiguity (i.e., inconsistency with conflicting evidence) which
may not be useful for agents to collect credible evidence
supporting either pro or con. On the other hand, the concept
of credibility refers to conciseness and consistency that can
provide a clear stance by providing clear, factual details
based on a rational, analytical reasoning process [7]. However,
credible information is not necessarily true as we can find
information that looks credible and real but it turns out to be
false. This is why we consider the four types of information,
given either pro or con can be true. In cases where there is
a clear true point of view, we declare one of pro vs. con
points of view to be correct. While there exists work in belief
models (e.g., Subjective Logic) to tie uncertainty in beliefs to
both quantity and balance of information supporting pro or
con points of view, there is no model that also incorporates
quality of information and an agent’s ability to assess quality
into opinion models. However, the interplay between these two
dimensions is a crucial aspect of dissemination of biased and
incorrect information in today’s social networks and has not
been widely studied.
This work has the following key contributions:
• We develop an agent-based opinion and information
model which allows the agent to form a uncertain opinion
based on Subjective Logic (SL) and to process informa-
tion different along two different dimensions in order to
explicitly deal with uncertainty in its opinion. Our model
allows four types of information, modeled along with pro
(P) vs. con (C) and noisy (N) vs. valuable (V) dimensions,
as detailed in Section III-C. To the best of our knowledge,
no prior work has considered the formulation of SL-based
opinions that can accept these types of information which
can be easily found in reality.
• We model agents’ topic competence which can signifi-
cantly affect their information processing in diagnosing
given evidence on whether it is noisy or valuable and
their decisions on whether to accept false information
after interacting with other agents. This allows us to
analyze the effect of agents’ topic competence on the
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degree of agents’ belief in false information under the
various information scenarios.
• We conduct comprehensive simulation experiments in
order to identify key factors that can increase the fraction
of agents not believing in false information, given that
‘belief’ in SL represents false information. Our findings
show that uncertainty is not necessarily always bad in
making a right decision when agents are capable of
not being biased for false information such as having a
neutral stance in their prior belief/disbelief towards the
given topic.
II. BACKGROUND & RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss existing work on decision making
under uncertainty and information credibility in public/social
media. We also give a brief overview on approaches to mitigate
or remove false information propagation in social networks.
A. Uncertainty in Decision Making
Many state-of-the-art studies have investigated how decision
makers use other alternative methods to deal with uncertainty
in decision making such as herding [1, 2, 16] or cognitive
bias [15, 19]. However, no prior work has investigated how
an individual agent forms its uncertain opinion in processing
information composed of credible (or valuable) or uncertain
(or noisy) evidence, which is explored in this work.
B. Information Credibility in Public/Social Media
Many approaches to derive information credibility have
been studied using social media datasets. Castillo et al. [4]
developed a credibility methodology by identifying a set of
features representing false information propagated through
Twitter. Sikdar et al. [17] proposed a methodology that com-
bines both direct and heuristic evaluations of credibility with
superior performance to the baseline counterparts. However,
these studies do not model or track change in opinions of
individuals and their uncertainty given a ground truth of
information credibility.
C. Countering False Information Propagation
Existing approaches to counter false information use two
main approaches: network analysis-based approach (NA) and
feature-based approach (FA). NA aims to stop false informa-
tion propagation by selecting a set of counter-misinformation
nodes (i.e., nodes to disseminate true information against
misinformation) [14]. The process of misinformation is also
modeled based on epidemic models with variants of SIR
(Susceptible-Infected-Recovered) model by introducing ‘for-
getting/remembering factor’ in rumor propagation [21]. FA
concentrates on identifing key features of false information or
the sources (i.e., users) of the false information in gossip diffu-
sion [20] and feature extraction for rumor identification [10].
Unlike the existing approaches in both NA and FA, this
work examines uncertainty of opinions in analyzing the prop-
agation of information considering agents’ topic competence,
prior belief and their opinion updates based on information
composed of the four different types as discussed earlier.
III. OPINION MODEL
In SL, an opinion is represented by three dimensions: belief
(b), disbelief (d), and uncertainty (u) [8]. A single opinion on
a given proposition is represented by:
b, d, u ∈ [0, 1]3, b+ d+ u = 1 (1)
We adopt SL to explicitly deal with uncertainty an agent
perceives in updating its opinion.
A. Opinion Formation
The agent may have degrees of belief (i.e., agree or pro)
and/or disbelief (i.e., disagree or con) towards a given propo-
sition with some degree of uncertainty. Agent i’s opinion on
proposition A is denoted as wAi . For simplicity, we omit A and
use wi to represent an agent i’s opinion as wi = {bi, di, ui, ai}
where ai is the base rate which normally represents general
background knowledge or judgment bias [8].
The base rate, ai, affects expectation probability (i.e., a
probability that an agent is expected to make a decision)
in either belief or disbelief [8], denoted by Ebi or Edi ,
respectively, where they are given by:
Ebi = bi + aiui, Edi = di + (1− ai)ui. (2)
Note that Ebi + Edi = 1 as bi + di + ui = 1. An
individual’s acceptance towards given information is affected
by various factors, including personality (e.g., agreeableness,
open-mindedness, stubbornness), impact of neighbors (e.g.,
herding), homophily (e.g., like-mindedness), competence (e.g.,
domain knowledge), or confidence (e.g., certain about its own
opinion). In this work, we particularly model and analyze the
effect of individuals’ topic competence on a given proposition
in which the topic competence may adjust the degree of the
prior belief and affect final decisions.
In SL, an agent forms its opinion based on the amount of
directly observed evidence based on the following mapping
rule:
b =
r
r + s+W
,d =
s
r + s+W
,u =
W
r + s+W
. (3)
where r is positive evidence and s is negative evidence for a
particular proposition. For simplicity, we dropped the subscript
i denoting the agent. When W = 0, b is a natural estimate
of the fractional evidence in favor of the proposition. To be
specific, W indicates the amount of uncertainty introduced by
the inherent errors or imperfect observability.
B. Opinion Update
In this section, we describe how our work modeled the
following: (i) the impact of an agent’s topic competence on its
prior belief/disbelief; (ii) homophily-based (i.e., like-minded)
opinion update; and and (iii) opinion decay over time. We
adopt the features of (ii) and (iii) from our prior work [6] and
include them here to be self-contained.
1) Prior Belief based on Topic Competence: An agent’s
topic competence is defined as the critical thinking ability
which can be against bias or prior belief even if such belief
is generally accepted by others in the network [18]. As this
work models this characteristic as a parameter, each agent i is
characterized by its own topic competence tci, ranged in [0, 1]
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as a real number, which is used for agent i to judge if given
information is valuable or noisy or if the prior belief or prior
disbelief, ai or 1−ai, is properly supporting given information
(e.g., given information is true or false). tci also affects how
much agent i is for/against its prior belief/disbelief favoring
pro or con, ai or 1− ai, depending on its judgmental ability
to diagnose true/false information. Assuming that given belief,
bi, represents the degree that i believes false information, i’s
prior belief can be adjusted based on its competence tci by:
aˆi = (1− (tci − 0.5))ai (4)
where aˆi is the adjusted prior belief while the prior disbelief is
(1− aˆi). Note that this is the case assuming that a given belief
represents the support for false information which is denoted
by pro while a given disbelief indicates not believing the false
information, denoted by con in the scenario considered in this
work. Recall that the adjusted prior belief/disbelief, aˆi/(1−aˆi),
will replace ai/(1−ai) in Eq. (2), which significantly impacts
agents’ final decision in pro/con. Eq. (4) implies that when
agent i has high competence, i is less likely to believe in false
information. Note that tci = 0.5 implies that the original prior
belief is used as intact (i.e., tci = 0.5) and there is a chance for
the prior belief to increase when tci < 0.5. This indicates that
when an agent has below the average competence (i.e., tci =
0.5), an agent’s bias can be even more pronounced. On the
other hand, its bias can be relaxed with the high competence
when it is above the average competence (i.e., tci > 0.5).
2) Homophily-based Opinion Consensus: Homophily, or
like-mindedness, significantly affects the way people update
opinions [13]. In this work, the similarity of two agents’ opin-
ions, denoted by sji , is computed based on cosine similarity
of the two opinion vectors i and j in terms of their belief and
disbelief, (bi, di) and (bj , dj), respectively. The calculation
of sji based on the cosine similarity is omitted due to its
popularity and space constraint.
We use sji , as a discounting operator [8], to determine the
degree to which agent i accepts agent j’s opinion. Given two
vectors of opinions, wi = {bi, di, ui} and wj = {bj , dj , uj},
agent j’s trust opinion in i’s opinion, sji , is given by wi⊗j =
{bi⊗j , di⊗j , ui⊗j} where each element is estimated by:
bi⊗j = s
j
i bj , di⊗j = s
j
idj , ui⊗j = 1− sji (1− uj) . (5)
where ui⊗j is simply derived by ui⊗j = 1 − bi⊗j − di⊗j
and bj + dj + uj = 1. For simplicity, we omit the time step
notation, but both sides of the equation refer to time step t.
We use SL’s consensus operator [8] for an agent’s opinion
update upon receiving new information. The updated opinion
of agent i after interaction with agent j is denoted as wi ⊕
bi⊗j = {bi ⊕ bi⊗j , di ⊕ bi⊗j , ui ⊕ bi⊗j} and each element is
given by:
bi ⊕ bi⊗j = biui⊗j + bi⊗jui
β
, (6)
di ⊕ di⊗j = diui⊗j + di⊗jui
β
,
ui ⊕ ui⊗j = 1− (bi ⊕ bi⊗j + di ⊕ di⊗j) .
where β = ui + ui⊗j − uiui⊗j and β 6= 0 is assumed. We
omit the time step notation; the left side represents wi(t+ 1)
while the right side uses the opinions at t such as wi(t) and
wj(t) = wi⊗j(t).
3) Opinion Decay over Time: Unless an agent receives
new information by interacting with other agents, its opinion
decays over time based on a decay factor, γ, over belief and
disbelief while uncertainty increases in proportion to γ. For
example, human cognition is limited by forgetting information
over time. We model the decayed opinion by:
bi = (1− γ)bi, di = (1− γ)di , ui = ui + γ(1− ui) . (7)
Note that ui is simply derived based on 1 − bi − di where
bi+di+ui = 1. Different from the opinion update by Eq. (6)
which allows the opinion update only for β > 0 and ui > 0,
respectively, the opinion decay based on Eq. (7) occurs at
every time step. Therefore, even if ui reaches 0, over time it
can increase (i.e., ui > 0) and accordingly agent i can update
its opinion upon receiving new information from its neighbors.
For simplicity, we omitted the time step notation, but the left
side is at time t+ 1 while the right side is at t.
C. Information Model
When an agent receives information from public/social
media (e.g., news articles shared), it discerns if the re-
ceived information is credible or not. To model Quality-of-
Information (QoI) representing information credibility in the
received information, we adopt the information model used
in [7] where QoI is presented by the following four aspects
of information: (1) noisy information without any reasonable,
analytical reasoning or clear facts; (2) valuable information
with clear, factual details based on a rational, analytical
reasoning process; (3) information to support pro for a given
proposition (e.g., believing a false rumor); and (4) information
to support con against a given proposition (e.g., disbelieving
a false rumor).
Recall that valuable (or credible) information is not neces-
sarily true. Regardless of the actual truthfulness of informa-
tion, information can be noisy or valuable. We consider the
four categories of information [7] as:
• Pro / Valuable (PV ): Information supports pro for given
information and is valuable.
• Pro / Noisy (PN ): Information supports pro for given
information but is noisy.
• Con / Valuable (CV ): Information supports con for given
information and is valuable.
• Con / Noisy (CN ): Information supports con for given
information but is noisy.
In this paper, we propose a novel method to incorporate this
information model to SL. We formulate the QoI based on Beta
distribution [8] considering the degree of uncertainty as an
opinion (see Eq. (3)), Q = {qb, qd, qu}, in SL treating the
amount of CN and PN as the amount of uncertain evidence
(i.e., W in Eq. (3)) where the number of PV as the amount of
evidence to support a pro (i.e., r in Eq. (3)), and the number
of CV as the amount of evidence to support a con (i.e., s in
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Eq. (3)). In reality, a human with limited cognitive capability
cannot capture the ground truth information. How to perceive
information (e.g., noisy vs. valuable) is significantly affected
by an agent’s competence, prior belief or bias. We define an
agent’s perceived opinion Qˆi = {qbi , qdi , qui} based on its
topic competence, tci. Note that agents’ topic competence tci
also affect the degree of their prior belief as described in Eq.
(4). The agent’s perceived opinion, Qˆi, is estimated based on
the mapping rule (Eq. (3)) where the number of perceived
positive, negative, and uncertain evidence by agents is obtained
by Algorithm 1 which returns nb, nd, and nu, respectively.
Given ns = nb + nd + nu, each element of an opinion Qˆi is
given by:
qbi =
nb
ns
, qdi =
nd
ns
, qui =
nu
ns
. (8)
In Algorithm 1, we assume that an agent can perfectly judge
whether evidence is pro or con, but cannot perfectly know
whether it is valuable or noisy. Hence, it uses its competence,
tci, to judge the evidence’s value (noisy or valuable). This
opinion, Qˆi, is used to initialize the opinions of original
propagators who first receive public/social media information
and disseminate it to its neighboring agents in a network.
IV. AGENT MODEL
This work considers an online social network as a directed
or undirected graph G where vertices, vi’s, are agents i’s
(e.g., users) in the set of V and the edges, eij’s (i.e., 1 for
an edge and 0 for no edge), represent the relationships in
the set E . Agent i’s neighbors refer to other agents directly
connected to i. In this work, a network is initialized with
a set of agents receiving information from public/social me-
dia. Then, the agents propagate their opinions based on the
received information to its neighboring agents (i.e., directly
connected agents). The neighboring agents propagate their
opinions further over a network. Hence, after the initial set of
seeding agents propagate their own opinions formed based on
their competence which processes the four types of evidence,
the information propagation continues until every agent has
a chance to propagate its own opinion (i.e., not the original
opinion from the original propagator) to its neighbors. This
way of the opinion propagation is to reflect the reality that
people tend to talk about their own opinions, not necessarily
what they exactly heard from others or media upon interactions
with others.
A. Agent Types
We have two types of agents as follows:
• Originators (Os): This agent i is selected to receive
media information which consists of both noisy and
valuable information. Its opinion vector {bi, di, ui} is set
to {bi, di, ui} = {qbi , qdi , qui} based on Eq. (8). A set of
original propagators (Os), s∗, is initially selected before
the interactions between agents. This type of agents does
not change for the whole session after they form their
opinions based on Eq. (8).
• Propagators (Ps): This agent i has low confidence (i.e.,
u → 1) in its own opinion by not initially agreeing
Algorithm 1 Mapping Evidence to an Opinion
1: procedure [nb , nd , nu] = MAPEVIDENCE(tc, EVD)
2: tc: an agent’s topic competence
3: EVD: a matrix of evidence (4 columns for PV, PN, CV, CN
and t rows for time steps from t = 1, · · · , T ) where evidence is
mapped to one of the four types of evidence, it is 1; 0 otherwise
(e.g., [1, 0, 0, 0] represents the evidence is PV)
4: nb = 0: counter for # of evidence supporting belief
5: nd = 0: counter for # of of evidence supporting disbelief
6: nu = 0: counter for # of of uncertain evidence, supporting
neither belief nor disbelief
7: T : Number of evidence
8: for t = 1 to T do
9: r = rand() . a random real number in [0, 1] based on
uniform distribution
10: if EVD(t) == 1 then
11: if r ≤ tc then . knows evidence is valuable
12: nb ← nb + 1
13: else
14: nu ← nu + 1
15: end if
16: else if EVD(t) == 2 then
17: if r ≤ tc then . knows evidence is noisy
18: nu ← nu + 1
19: else
20: nb ← nb + 1
21: end if
22: else if EVD(t) == 3 then
23: if r ≤ tc then . knows evidence is valuable
24: nd ← nd + 1
25: else
26: nu ← nu + 1
27: end if
28: else . EVD(t) == 4
29: if r ≤ tc then . knows evidence is noisy
30: nu ← nu + 1
31: else
32: nd ← nd + 1
33: end if
34: end if
35: end for
36: end procedure
or disagreeing with given information (i.e., b → 0
and d → 0). This agent is initialized with its opinion
with (r, s,W ) = (1, 1, n) where n >> 1, leading to
{bi, di, ui} = { 1n+2 , 1n+2 , nn+2}, implying low confi-
dence in a given proposition due to lack of information
(i.e., ignorance). This type of agents keeps updating their
opinions unless its uncertainty u reaches 0, based on SL’s
consensus operator in Eq. (6).
As discussed in Section III-B, uncertainty can increase as an
opinion decays over time as shown in Eq. (7). For simplic-
ity, we adopt the high effectiveness (influence) property [3]
assuming that when j propagates its opinion to its neighbor
i, then i will accept it with perfect probability (i.e., 1) and
accordingly update its opinion unless i is an originator.
B. Epidemic Status of Agents
We model the evolution of false information propagation
using a variant of the SIR model [6]. The three states in the
SIR model are defined based on the conditions associated with
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TABLE I: Key parameters and their default values
param. val. param. val. param. val.
n 1000 (tcµ, tcstd) (0.5, 0.1) γ 0.05
s∗ N × 0.01 (aµ, astd) (0.5, 0.1) nr 100
TABLE II: Network dataset statistics
N 1033 Ave. degree 51.785 Ave. path length 2.949
|E| 26747 Modularity 0.54 Ave. clustering coeff. 0.534
the expected belief or disbelief probabilities, Ebi and Edi , as
follows:
• Susceptible (S): An agent is not sure of whether it
believes false information or not. Agents in S have
opinions with Eb ≤ 0.5 and Ed ≤ 0.5;
• Infected (I): An agent believes false information as true
with Eb > 0.5; and
• Recovered (R): An agent does not believe false informa-
tion with Ed > 0.5.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we describe metrics used for the experi-
ments and detailed experimental setup. We also analyze the
experimental results and discuss their overall trends.
A. Metrics
• Agents’ average opinion: This metric shows the aver-
age value of an opinion with three dimensions, belief,
disbelief, and uncertainty. Since the scenario is that
belief indicates an supporting opinion for given false
information, lower belief and higher disbelief are desir-
able while the degree of uncertainty will play a role in
increasing/decreasing belief/disbelief.
• Fraction of recovered agents (R): Based on the SIR
model used in our work (see Section IV-B), this metric
refers to the fraction of agents which are in the status
of the recovered (R(t)) over all propagators. This metric
indicates the fraction of agents that do not believe false
information with Ed > 0.5.
B. Experimental Setup
For the network topology, we use an ego-Facebook
dataset [11] which gives a fully connected undirected network
described by Table II. To disseminate the original public
information by a given set of originators, we seed 1 % of
the total nodes, denoted by s∗, which is 11 nodes in the
given network and model the rest of the nodes (i.e., 1022) as
propagators. We consider opinion decay factor γ set to 0.05
and mean prior belief aµ = 0.5 with the standard deviation
astd = 0.1, implying that both prior belief and prior disbelief
are fairly same. Agents’ topic competence is assigned with the
mean tcµ = 0.5 with the standard deviation tcstd = 0.1. The
key design parameters and their default values used for our
experiments are summarized in Table I. The data points shown
in the results are the average values based on the collected data
from simulation runs nr = 100.
Information propagation proceeds as follows. A given num-
ber of originators, s∗, is initiated with the set of opinions, Qˆ
as described in Section III-C. After the originators form their
opinions by processing the four types of evidence, PV, PC,
CV, and CN, they propagate their opinions to their neighbors.
Accordingly, the neighbors also forward their updated opinions
to their neighbors based on Eq. (6). Note that each agent has a
chance to disseminate its opinion to its neighbors. We discuss
the effect of the key design parameter values on the given
metrics in Section V-A in the following section.
C. Results and Analysis
In this section, we conduct sensitivity analysis by varying
the values of key design parameters, mainly including varying
the ratio of information types (i.e., # of PV, PN, CV, and CN)
and the degree of agents’ topic competence.
1) Effect of Varying the Amount of Valuable Informa-
tion (PV and CV): Fig. 1 shows how the amount of valuable
evidence (i.e., #PV and #CV) affects agents’ mean opinion
in terms of three dimensions, denoted by b, d, and u, and
the fraction of recovered agents (R). In Fig. 1 (a) showing
the mean b, the increase of #CV decreases b because more
uncertain evidence is introduced by agents’ imperfect topic
competence (i.e., tcµ = 0.5). However, as #PV increases, b
increases with relatively less uncertain evidence, as seen in
Fig. 1 (c). In addition, the increasing trends of b is observed
as #CV increases with higher #PV (≥ 5000) because of
the decreasing uncertain evidence u based on the increased
amount of valuable evidence. However, with higher #CV
(≥ 4000), b decreases again due to the increased uncertain
evidence introduced by imperfect competence used to detect
noisy or valuable evidence. In Fig. 1 (b), we show the effect
of varying #CV and #PV in d. As expected, higher #PV shows
the lowest d while the increase of #CV increases d overall. In
Fig. 1 (b), lower #PV and/or higher #CV increases d which
is intuitively true. In Fig. 1 (c), we show u as #CV and #PV
increase. Under relatively low #PV (i.e., #PV ≤ 2000), we
can see increasing uncertainty with higher #CV because of the
imperfect topic competence. However, under relatively higher
#PV, higher #CV decreases u due to the increased effect of d.
In particular, when #PV= 6000, the minimum point of u at
#CV= 4000, which is generated based on the tradeoff between
b and d because of b+d+u = 1. Finally, Fig. 1 (d) shows the
fraction of recovered agents, R, where an agent is identified
as recovered, meaning that the agent does not believe false
information, b, with Ed > 0.5. From this figure, we can clearly
observe the positive effect of #CV, showing that higher #CV
increases R, because its misdetection can increase uncertainty
which is also considered in calculating expected disbelief in
Eq. (2). In addition, higher #PV is also clear by decreasing R.
The noticeable finding is that the imperfect topic competence
increases uncertain evidence which can allow agents to make
right decisions (disbelieving false information) because they
are not at least biased for false information b. However, the
increased uncertainty does not allow d orR to increase further.
2) Effect of Varying the Amount of Noisy Information
(PN and CN): Fig. 2 shows how the noisy information (i.e.,
#CV and #CN) affects b, d, u, and R when agents are given
with the mean topic competence, tc = 0.5. Very similar to
the trends observed in Fig. 1, the effect of #CN is clearer in
b with lower #PN and in d with higher #PN. That is, higher
#PN significantly mitigates the positive effect of higher #CN,
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(a) b (b) d (c) u (d) R
Fig. 1: Effect of varying the amount of valuable information
(a) b (b) d (c) u (d) R
Fig. 2: Effect of varying the amount of noisy information
(a) b (b) d (c) u (d) R
Fig. 3: Effect of the topic competence under varying the amount of valuable pro evidence (PV)
(a) b (b) d (c) u (d) R
Fig. 4: Effect of the topic competence under the amount of valuable con evidence (CV)
detecting half valuable con and half noisy con which lead to
higher d. Overall the effect of noisy information is very similar
to that of valuable information although the effect of valuable
information slightly shows the better performance in R. Now
we discuss the effect of varying agents’ topic competence as
below.
3) Effect of Varying the Amount of Agents’ Topic
Competence under Varying the Amount of PV: Fig. 3
shows how agents process their opinions and update them
based on their different topic competence with respect to
varying #PV when #CV, #CN, and #PN are fixed at 1000.
From this figure, we find very interesting results because the
trends of b and d look counter-intuitive. But the reasons can be
well explained in terms of the amount of uncertain evidence
diagnosed based on agents’ topic competence given. To be
specific, in b shown in Fig. 3 (a), the lowest topic competence
(i.e., tc = 0) shows the lowest b while the highest topic
competence (i.e., tc = 1) shows the highest b because tc = 0
takes all b and d evidence (i.e., #PV and #CV) as uncertain
evidence, u, resulting in too high uncertainty generated, as
shown in u shown in 3 (c). Similarly, the effect of significantly
increased u is observed in b (3 (a)), showing the highest b
with tc = 1. The increased b with tc = 1 also reduces d as
b + d + u = 1. When tc = 1, only noisy information (1000
#PN and 1000 #CN) is counted as uncertain evidence while
others will be either b or d. Thus, uncertainty with tc = 1 is
the lowest. That is, compared to the increased tc that reduces
agents’ prior belief (see Eq. (4)) and lessens b but increases d,
the largeness of increased uncertain evidence, u, exceeds the
effect of reduced prior belief, resulting in higher b and lower
d with high tc where #PV is larger than any other evidence
types.
4) Effect of Varying the Amount of Agents’ Topic
Competence under Varying the Amount of CV: Lastly, Fig.
4 shows the effect of agents’ topic competence with respect to
varying #CV when #CN, #PV, and #PN are set to 1000. Recall
that based on Algorithm 1, the correct detection of #CV means
that the evidence is detected as valuable con information (i.e.,
true information) while misdetection of #CV means that the
evidence is detected as uncertain evidence. Unlike Fig. 3
6
showing that higher tc generates more b and less d as #PV
increases, the effect of #CV follows the intuitive results such
that higher tc generates more d and less b, leading to higherR.
As mentioned earlier, this trend is reasonable because higher
#CV means more valuable evidence to support con which
corresponds to d while generated uncertain evidence due to
imperfect topic competence from given #CV can increase R
as well. VI. CONCLUSION
The key findings are summarized as follows:
• An appropriate amount of valuable information (e.g.,
#CV) exists to maximize valuable evidence to support
truth while minimizing uncertain evidence.
• The amount of uncertain evidence can help when agents
are not at least biased favoring for false information (i.e.,
b), meaning that agents’ base rate, ai, does not exceed
0.5, resulting in higher R.
• When the amount of false evidence (e.g., #PV) exceeds
that of true evidence (e.g., #CV), higher tc may increase
the amount of false information, b. However, since higher
tc can reduce the effect of false information, b, by using
lower prior belief in the false information, higher tc
can achieve higher R even with more valuable evidence
supporting false information with the help of uncertain
evidence which is interpreted as not supporting the false
information.
• When the amount of true evidence (e.g., #CV) exceeds
that of false evidence (e.g., #PV), higher tc helps increase
d and accordingly R. This is because even misdetection
of true evidence can increase the amount of uncertain
evidence which can be well utilized to increase expected
disbelief, leading to higher R with the reduced bias
towards false information with higher tc.
The future work directions of this research can follow: (i) the
investigation on the effect of centrality types of information
originators in various network topologies; (ii) the improve-
ment of designing agents’ prior belief (i.e., base rate) to
dynamic prior belief based on all prior evidence; and (iii)
the development of uncertainty detector by examining text
mining techniques which can be used for the validation of
the presented opinion and information model.
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